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Abstract
The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when
the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class
of choice rules, any communication verifying that an alternative is in the rule must
reveal supporting budget sets for the agents such that the optimality of the proposed
alternative to all agents within their respective budget set in itself veriﬁes the al-
ternative. We characterize the budget equilibria that are the minimally informative
messages verifying a given choice rule. This characterization is used to identify the
communication burden of choice rules, measured with the number of transmitted
bits or real variables. Applications include eﬃciency in convex economies, exact or
approximate surplus maximization in combinatorial auctions, the core in indivisible-
good economies, and stable many-to-one matchings.
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This paper considers the problem of ﬁnding allocations that satisfy certain social goals
when economic agents have private information regarding their preferences. This problem
has received renewed interest in the literature on “market design”–in particular, in two-
sided matching (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) and combinatorial auctions (e.g., Vohra
and de Vries (2003)). The goals of market design include exact or approximate eﬃciency,
voluntary participation, stability to group deviations, and some notions of fairness. A
key theme in the literature is that incentives alone do not determine the choice of the
mechanism. Indeed, if incentive compatibility were the only concern, it could be ensured
with a direct revelation mechanism. However, in many practical settings, full revelation
of agents’ preferences would be prohibitively costly, even if the agents were willing to
report truthfully. For example, in combinatorial auctions, full revelation would require
communicating bidders’ valuations for all possible bundles of objects, and the number of
such bundles is exponential in the number of objects. For this reason, the literature has
considered a variety of indirect mechanisms, which purport achieve the desired goals using
less communication than full revelation.1 This raises the question: What is the minimal
information that must be elicited by the designer in order to achieve the goals (even if
agents are sincere), and how much communication does this require?
The communication requirements of allocation mechanisms were ﬁrst discussed by
Hayek (1945), who called attention to the “problem of the utilization of knowledge that is
not given to anyone in its totality,” when “practically every individual ... possesses unique
information of which beneﬁcial use might be made.” Hayek argued that “we cannot expect
that this problem will be solved by ﬁrst communicating all this knowledge to a central
board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues it orders.” Instead, “the ultimate de-
cisions must be left to the people who are familiar with the ... particular circumstances of
time and place.” At the same time, the decisions must be guided by prices, which sum-
1Another motivation for indirect mechanisms, cited by Parkes (2000), is to economize on the agents’ cost
of computing (rather than communicating) their preferences. However, in the absence of communication
costs, the agents could reveal all the raw data for their computations and let the designer perform them
as needed (or possibly share the computational burden with the agents).
1marize the information needed “to co-ordinate the separate actions of diﬀerent people.”
While Hayek did not discuss allocation mechanisms other than the price mechanism and
central planning (full revelation), he noted that “nobody has yet succeeded in designing
an alternative system” that would fully utilize individual knowledge.
While price mechanisms in allocation problems have received extensive scrutiny since
Hayek, existing research has failed to answer the following four questions:
1.I si tnecessary to ﬁnd some supporting prices in order to achieve social goals?
2. For which preference domains is it necessary to ﬁnd supporting prices?
3. For which social goals is it necessary to ﬁnd supporting prices?
4. What kind of prices verify a given social goal on a given preference domain while
revealing the minimal necessary information?
The best-known results about the role of prices are the Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics. These theorems fail to address even question (1). Indeed, the First
Welfare Theorem says that supporting prices are suﬃcient to verify Pareto eﬃciency, but
does not establish their necessity. The Second Welfare Theorem only says that supporting
prices can be constructed for a given Pareto eﬃcient allocation once all the information
about the economy is available. However, once all the information is available, the desired
allocation can be imposed directly, without using prices. The theorems have nothing to say
about possible eﬃcient non-price mechanisms in an economy with distributed knowledge
of preferences.
A better understanding of the role of prices is oﬀered by the literature on the “informa-
tional eﬃciency” of price equilibrium. The literature was started by Hurwicz (1977) and
Mount and Reiter (1974), who showed that in convex exchange economies, the Walrasian
price mechanism uses the least-dimensional message space among all Pareto eﬃcient ver-
iﬁcation mechanisms satisfying a continuity restriction. Jordan (1982) strengthened this
result by showing that the Walrasian mechanism is a unique individually rational mech-
anism with this property. These results were later extended to convex economies with
public goods and externalities (Sato 1981; Tian 2004). While providing an important
2inspiration for the present paper, this literature still comes short of answering questions
(1)-(4). Indeed, it does not answer (1), because it focuses on dimensionally minimal con-
tinuous mechanisms, and does not rule out the possibility that either discontinuous or
slightly more complex continuous mechanisms could achieve eﬃciency without revealing
supporting prices. It does not answer (2), because it only considers settings in which agents
have convex preferences over divisible allocations.2 In fact, the typical continuity restric-
tion in the literature rules out the communication of discrete allocations, and so makes it
inapplicable to most market design settings. The literature does not answer (3), because it
restricts attention to the goal of Pareto eﬃciency. As noted by Nisan and Segal (2003), this
restriction may overstate the hardness of the problem, because in some settings (notably
that of Calsamiglia (1977)) permitting a very small ineﬃciency allows a dramatic reduction
in the communication burden. In other settings (such as matching without side transfers),
eﬃciency may be achieved trivially, and the designer may be interested in other objectives,
such as voluntary participation, stability to group deviations, or some notions of fairness.
The literature does not answer (4), because of its ad hoc focus on linear-price equilibria,
which fail to exist in many important social choice problems.3
The present paper answers questions (1)-(4). It examines communication protocols
realizing a social choice rule when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences.
While general communication is a multi-stage (extensive-form) game, a simple lower bound
on this problem is oﬀered by an omniscient oracle’s problem of verifying the desirability of
an alternative. This problem is known as the “veriﬁcation problem” in the informational
2Calsamiglia (1977) considered the communication burden with nonconvex preferences over divisible
goods, but failed to note the role of prices in this setting.
3Another related result is obtained by Parkes (2002). He considers the combinatorial auction problem
with quasilinear preferences and shows the necessity of revealing supporting prices by those communication
languages that reveal so-called “outcome-independent” information and implement surplus-maximizing
allocations. This result still does not answer questions (1)-(4), because it considers a restricted set of com-
munication mechanisms, a speciﬁc allocation setting, and only the goal of surplus-maximization. Parkes’s
proof uses the duality theory for optimization problems, and thus could not be easily extended to social
choice rules that cannot be described as solutions to a maximization problem (including the Pareto rule
in the presence of wealth eﬀects).
3eﬃciency literature and as the “nondeterministic problem” in computer science.
In one special class of veriﬁcation protocols, the oracle proposes an alternative and
gives each agent a budget set–a subset of social alternatives (which could in general be
delineated by personalized and nonlinear prices). Each agent is asked to verify that the
proposed alternative is optimal to him within his budget set. A choice rule can be veriﬁed
with such a “budget protocol” if and only if it is monotonic (in the sense of Maskin
(1999)). While generalizing the traditional welfare theorems, this observation inherits
their deﬁciency: Just because a choice rule can be realized with a budget protocol does
not mean that it cannot be realized with a completely diﬀerent, and perhaps much simpler,
protocol.
Enter the main result of the paper, which characterizes the choice rules satisfying the
Communication Welfare Theorem (CWT): Any veriﬁcation protocol must reveal enough
information to construct supporting budget sets verifying the choice rule. Such choice rules
are characterized by the property of intersection monotonicity, which is a strengthening of
monotonicity, and proves to be satisﬁed by such important rules as Pareto, approximate
Pareto, the core, stable matching, and no-envy rules. For all these choice rules, any
veriﬁcation protocol (and therefore any communication) must reveal supporting budget
sets.
What appears striking about this result is that even in a social choice problem with
sincere agents, a minimally informative veriﬁcation mechanism asks the agents to pursue
their individual objectives independently within their budget sets. Our intuition for this
result is that intersection monotonicity postulates certain congruence between the agents’
individual preferences and the social goals, which allows to economize on communication
by giving agents some freedom to utilize their individual knowledge, while designing the
budget sets to coordinate their choices.
We next turn to the question of which supporting budget sets must be revealed to verify
a given choice rule. The larger an agent’s budget set is, the more informative is the fact
that proposed alternative is optimal to him within the set. On the one hand, the agents’
budget sets must be large enough so as to verify that the proposed alternative is in the
choice rule. On the other hand, supporting budget sets that are too large reveal more
4information than necessary for the veriﬁc a t i o n .W ec h a r a c t e r i z et h eminimally informative
budget equilibria verifying that a given alternative is desirable. (When there are many
equally informative budget equilibria, we select among them the ones with the largest
budget sets.) Under CWT, such budget equilibria exhaust all the minimally informative
verifying messages. Application of the characterization to several well-known social choice
problems yields the following results:
• The minimally informative messages verifying Pareto eﬃciency in an exchange econ-
omy with smooth convex preferences are equivalent to Walrasian equilibria,i nw h i c h
the budget sets are delineated by linear and anonymous prices.
• The minimally informative messages verifying Pareto eﬃciency in a social choice
problem with numeraire are equivalent to the valuation equilibria of Mas-Colell
(1980), in which the budget sets are delineated by nonlinear personalized prices
whose sum across agents is independent of the public decision.
• The minimally informative messages verifying the approximation of Pareto eﬃciency
in a social choice problem with numeraire within some δ > 0 (as measured by the
compensating variation in terms of numeraire) are equivalent to δ-valuation equi-
libria, in which the sum of the nonlinear personalized prices across agents for any
oﬀ-equilibrium public decision exceeds by δ that for the equilibrium decision.
• The minimally informative messages verifying Pareto eﬃciency and individual ratio-
nality on the universal preference domain are equivalent to partitional equilibria,i n
which the agents’ budget sets include the status-quo alternative and partition all the
other oﬀ-equilibrium alternatives.
• The minimally informative messages verifying the stability of a many-to-one two-
sided matching are equivalent to match-partitional equilibria, in which each oﬀ-
equilibrium match is allocated to either partner’s budget set (but not both).
These results are formulated in the partial informativeness order on messages, and
so they do not rely on any scalar measure of communication. However, the results also
5prove useful for identifying the communication burden, as measured either with the num-
ber of transmitted bits (for discrete communication, as in the “communication complexity”
literature surveyed by Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997)) or with the dimension of the mes-
sage space (for continuous communication, as in the “informational eﬃciency” literature).
Speciﬁcally, the results imply that the communication burden of verifying a choice rule
satisfying CWT is exactly that of announcing a minimally informative verifying budget
equilibrium. In general, a veriﬁcation protocol need not use all such budget equilibria,
since it only needs to verify one desirable alternative in a given state rather than all of
them. For example, in a convex exchange economy, Pareto eﬃciency can be realized using
only those Walrasian budget sets that contain an (arbitrarily ﬁxed) endowment allocation,
which reduces the dimensionality of the space of equilibria while still ensuring equilibrium
existence. In general, the nondeterministic communication burden of a choice rule F sat-
isfying CWT is determined by a minimal collection E of minimally informative budget
equilibria verifying F that ensures the existence of an equilibrium from E.N a m e l y , t h e
burden of F is exactly that of communicating an equilibrium from E, which requires dimE
real variables for continuous communication, or log2 |E| bits for discrete communication.
This number also bounds below the burden of deterministic communication, i.e., ﬁnding
a desirable alternative. (While in some settings there exists a known deterministic com-
munication protocol coming close to achieving this lower bound, the general problem of
identifying the deterministic communication burden of a social choice rule appears to be
much harder and is not tackled here.)
This approach is used to identify (or bound) the communication burden of several
well-known social choice problems. In some problems, the burden proves to be of the same
order of magnitude as full revelation of agents’ preferences. These problems include: ﬁnding
combinatorial allocations that achieve or approximate the maximum total surplus, ﬁnding
Pareto eﬃcient individually rational allocations in economies with indivisible goods, and
ﬁnding stable two-sided one-to-one matchings.4 Other social choice problems can be solved
with much less communication than full revelation. These problems include: ﬁnding Pareto
4The analysis of combinatorial allocations borrows from Nisan and Segal (2003), who also examine the
communication burden for several important restricted classes of valuations.
6eﬃcient allocations in convex exchange economies, and ﬁnding stable two-sided many-to-
one matchings when the agents have substitutable preferences. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm ﬁnds a stable matching using close to
the smallest necessary amount of communication, which is exponentially smaller than full
revelation of preferences.
2 Social Choice and Communication
Let N be a ﬁnite set of agents, and X be a set of social alternatives. (With a slight
abuse of notation, the same letter will denote a set and its cardinality when this causes no
confusion.) Let P denote the set of all preference relations over set X.5 For any preference
relation R ∈ P and any alternative x ∈ X,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne the relation’s lower
contour set at x, L(x,R)={y ∈ X : xRy}.
Each agent i’s preference relation is assumed to be his privately observed type,a n d
the set of his possible types is denoted by Ri ⊂ P.6 A state is a preference proﬁle
R =( R1,...,R N) ∈ R1 ×...×R N ≡ R,w h e r eR is the state space, also called preference
domain. The goal is to realize a choice rule, which is a correspondence F : R ³ X.F o r
every state R ∈ R, the rule speciﬁes the set F (R) of “desirable” alternatives in this state.
We now describe the communication procedures solving the social choice problem. It
is well known that the amount of communication can be reduced by letting agents send
messages sequentially rather than simultaneously. For example, if we want to ﬁnd a Pareto
eﬃcient alternative, agents need not report their preferences between alternatives x and y if
it is clear from the preceding messages that y is dominated by z for all of them. Therefore,
we must consider multi-round communication protocols.
5A preference relation R over set X is a binary relation over X,w i t hxRy interpreted as “x is weakly
preferred to y.” It is common to restrict attention to preference relations that are rational, i.e., complete
and transitive. Rationality will play no role in the general analysis, but it will be assumed in all the
applications.
6Thus, we focus on “private-value” environments. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to
“interdependent-value” environments, in which an agent’s preferences may depend on other agents’ private
information.
7In the language of game theory, a multi-round communication protocol speciﬁes an
extensive-form message game and each agent’s strategy in this game (complete message
plan contingent on his type and the observed history). Instead of payoﬀs, the game assigns
alternatives to terminal nodes (and so is more properly called a “mechanism”). Agents
are assumed to follow the prescribed strategies (but see Section 4 for a discussion of in-
centive compatibility). Such communication protocols are known in computer science as
“deterministic,” because the message sent by an agent at a given information set is fully
determined by his type and the preceding messages. A protocol realizes choice correspon-
dence F if in every state R it achieves a terminal node to which an alternative from F (R)
is assigned.7
Characterizing all deterministic communication protocols is a tall order. Analysis is
drastically simpliﬁed by generalizing the notion of communication to allow what is called
“nondeterministic communication” in computer science and “the veriﬁcation scenario” in
economics: Imagine an omniscient oracle who knows the true state R and consequently the
desirable alternatives. However, he needs to prove to an ignorant outsider that alternative
x ∈ F(R) is indeed desirable. He does this by publicly announcing a message m ∈ M.
Each agent i either accepts or rejects the message, doing this on the basis of his own type
Ri. The acceptance of message m by all agents must prove to the outsider that alternative
x is desirable.8
While nondeterministic communication is patently unrealistic, we introduce it for the
following reasons:
1. Any deterministic communication protocol can be represented as nondeterministic
by letting all the messages be sent by the oracle instead of the agents, and having
each agent accept the message sequence if and only if all the messages sent in his
stead are consistent with his strategy given his type. The oracle’s message space M
7Note that only nonempty-valued choice rules can be realized. Nonempty-valuedness could be ensured
by thinking of states R ∈ R in which F (R)=∅ as “illegal,” and allowing any alternative in such states
(i.e., redeﬁning F (R)=X).
8This communication is called “nondeterministic” in computer science because the oracle has to “guess”
a message that is acceptable to all agents (and there may be more than one such message in a given state).
8is thus identiﬁed with the set of the protocol’s possible message sequences (terminal
nodes). Therefore, any statement about nondeterministic protocols will apply to
deterministic protocols as a particular case (this is explained more thoroughly in
Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997, Chapter 2)).
2. A famous economic example of nondeterministic communication is Walrasian equilib-
rium. The role of the oracle is played by the “Walrasian auctioneer,” who announces
the equilibrium prices and allocations. Each agent accepts the announcement if and
only if his announced allocation constitutes his optimal choice from the budget set
given by the announced prices. A generalization of this nondeterministic communi-
cation is described in the next section.
3. A nondeterministic protocol realizing choice rule F may be viewed as a steady state of
an iterative deterministic protocol realizing or approximating F. At each stage of the
iteration, a message m ∈ M is announced, and each agent reports a direction in which
the message should be adjusted to become “more acceptable” to him. Examples of
such adjustment processes include “tatonnement” for ﬁnding Walrasian equilibria,
“deferred acceptance algorithms” for ﬁnding stable matchings, and ascending-bid
auctions for ﬁnding eﬃcient combinatorial allocations.
Formally, nondeterministic communication is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A (nondeterministic communication) protocol is a triple Γ = hM,µ,hi,
where
• M is the message space,
• µ : R ³ M is the message correspondence satisfying Privacy Preservation:
µ(R)=∩i∈Nµi(Ri) ∀R ∈ R, where µi : Ri ³ M ∀i ∈ N,
• h : M ³ X is the outcome correspondence.
Γ realizes choice rule F if ∅ 6= h(µ(R)) ⊂ F(R) ∀R ∈ R.
Γ fully realizes F if h(µ(R)) = F(R) ∀R ∈ R.
9Privacy Preservation captures the fact that each agent does not observe other agents’
types, thus the set of messages acceptable to him is a function µi(Ri) of his own type Ri
only.9 Realization means the set of messages generated by the protocol in state R is a
subset of the set of desirable messages F (R), while full realization means that it is exactly
F (R). We are ultimately interested in realization, but the concept of full realization allows
comparisons with some existing literature.
Deﬁnition 2 Message m ∈ M in protocol Γ = hM,µ,hi veriﬁes alternative x ∈ X in
choice rule F if µ−1(m) ⊂ F−1 (x).( Γ and F will be omitted when clear from the context.)
If we are interested in whether a given message correspondence µ c a nb eu s e dt or e a l i z e
choice rule F, without loss we can deﬁne the outcome correspondence h(m) to be the
set of alternatives veriﬁed by message m. T h e nr e a l i z a t i o nm e a n st h a t ,i na n ys t a t eR,
some alternative is veriﬁed by an acceptable message, while full realization means that any
alternative in F (R) is veriﬁed by some acceptable message.
The above concepts have a graphical illustration, discussed in Kushilevitz and Nisan
(1997), and depicted in Figure 1.N a m e l y ,e a c hµ−1(m) is the subset of the state space R
on which message m ∈ M is acceptable. Privacy Preservation requires each such subset to




N (m)–a “rectangle” in the computer science parlance.
Message m veriﬁes alternative x if the corresponding rectangle µ−1(m) is contained in
the set F −1 (x) on which x is desirable–in the computer science parlance, the rectangle is
“monochromatic”. Realization requires that the whole state space be covered by rectangles
verifying some alternative, while full realization requires that each set F −1 (x) for x ∈ X
be exactly covered by some set of rectangles.
We will be interested in how much information must be revealed to realize a given
choice rule, using the partial order of informativeness:
Deﬁnition 3 Message m ∈ M in protocol hM,µ,hi is more informative than (or veri-
ﬁes) message ˜ m ∈ ˜ M in protocol
D
˜ M,˜ µ,˜ h
E
if µ−1 (m) ⊂ ˜ µ−1 (˜ m). Messages m and ˜ m
9This is an established term in the economic literature on “informational eﬃciency,” but it diﬀers from
the layman’s concept of “privacy” in that it places no constraints on the revelation of information in the
course of communication.
10are equivalent if they are equally informative, i.e., µ−1 (m)=˜ µ−1 (˜ m). Message m is a
minimally informative message verifying alternative x ∈ X if it veriﬁes x,a n da n yl e s s
informative message verifying x is equivalent to m.
We will examine how a given choice rule can be realized using messages that are less
informative, and possibly minimally informative. This examination will demonstrate what
information must be revealed by any protocol realizing a given social choice rule F,a n d
how much communication this would require (in terms of bits or real numbers). For the
latter, we note for now that the communication burden of a protocol is linked to the size of
its message space M (see Section 7 below for more detail). Thus, starting with a protocol
realizing F and replacing a message with a less informative message that still veriﬁes the
same alternative would produce another protocol realizing F, whose size of the message
space, and therefore the communication burden, will not be higher than that of the original
protocol. It will follow that in looking for a nondeterministic protocol realizing F with the
minimal communication burden, one can without loss restrict attention to protocols using
only minimally informative verifying messages.
3 Budget Equilibria and the Welfare Theorems
We introduce a special class of nondeterministic protocols, in which the oracle’s message
consists of a proposed alternative x ∈ X and a budget set Bi ⊂ X for each agent i.E a c h
agent i ∈ N accepts message (B1,...,B N,x) if and only if there is no alternative in his
budget set Bi that he strictly prefers to the proposed alternative x. (B1,...,B N,x) is a
budget equilibrium in state R ∈ R if it is accepted by all agents in this state.10 Formally,




XN × X : Bi ⊂ L(x,Ri) ∀i ∈ N
ª
.
10A number of related concepts have been suggested, including “social equilibrium” (Debreu 1952),
“social situations” (Greenberg 1990), “eﬀectivity functions” (Moulin and Peleg 1982), “eﬀectivity forms”
(Miyagawa 2002), “opportunity equilibrium” (Ju 2001), and “interactive choice sets” (Serrano and Volij
2000). However, all these papers have motivated the concept by incentive compatibility, rather than
deriving it from communication among sincere agents (see also Section 4 below).
11E satisﬁes Privacy Preservation because each agent’s acceptance depends only on his own
preferences.
The oracle’s message space M in a budget protocol is a collection of budget equilibria
that he is allowed to announce, and the outcome function simply implements the proposed
alternative:
Deﬁnition 4 Protocol hM,µ,hi is a budget protocol if M ⊂ 2XN×X, µ(R)=E (R)∩M
∀R ∈ R,a n dh(B,x)={x} ∀(B,x) ∈ M.
The informativeness of a budget equilibrium message depends on how large the agents’
budget sets are. Formally, consider
Deﬁnition 5 For two budget equilibria (B,x),(B0,x 0) ∈ 2XN × X, (B0,x 0) is larger than
(B,x) if x = x0 and Bi ⊂ B0
i ∀i ∈ N.
It is clear that if budget equilibrium (B0,x 0) is larger than budget equilibrium (B,x),
then (B0,x 0) it is more informative (i.e., (B0,x 0) being an equilibrium ensures that (B,x)
is also an equilibrium). Thus, the oracle must announce supporting budget sets that are
large enough to verify the proposed allocation.11
Which choice rules can be realized by a budget protocol? The classical Welfare Theo-
rems say that any Pareto eﬃcient allocation in a convex exchange economy can be veriﬁed
with a budget equilibrium (speciﬁcally, a Walrasian equilibrium). The theorems have been
extended to some “non-classical” social choice problems.12 These results can be generalized
as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (Maskin (1999)) Choice rule F is monotonic if ∀R ∈ R, ∀x ∈ F (R),a n d
∀R0 ∈ R such that L(x,Ri) ⊂ L(x,R0
i) ∀i ∈ N, we have x ∈ F (R0).
11For example, when Bi = {x} for all i, budget equilibrium (B,x) is uninformative and does not verify
x, unless it is always selected by the choice rule.
12Including the Pareto rule in public-good economies (Milleron 1972) and general economies with nu-
meraire (Mas-Colell 1980; Bikhchandani and Mamer 1997; Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002), and stable
many-to-one matching problems with and without transfers (Kelso and Crawford 1982; Hatﬁeld and Mil-
grom 2004).
12Theorem 1 A choice rule F is fully realized by a budget protocol if and only if it is
monotonic.13
Proof. That F is fully realized with a budget protocol means that ∀R ∈ R ∀x ∈ F (R)
∃B ∈ 2NX such that (B,x) ∈ E (R) and (B,x) veriﬁes x. Since a larger budget equilibrium
is more informative and so more likely to verify x, this is equivalent to checking that the
largest budget equilibrium (B,x) supporting x in state R, which has Bi = L(x,Ri) ∀i ∈ N,
veriﬁes x. This is in turn equivalent to the monotonicity of F.
Theorem 1 is not novel: analogous results are stated in Williams (1986, Theorem 2),
Miyagawa’s (2002, Theorem 1), Ju (2001), and Greenberg (1990, Theorem 10.1.2). The key
deﬁciency of Theorem 1 is that, just like the traditional Welfare Theorems, it does not say
anything about non-budget protocols realizing choice rule F, which could possibly reveal
less information and involve less communication than any budget protocol realizing F.W e
remedy this deﬁciency by characterizing choice rules that satisfy the following property:
Deﬁnition 7 Choice rule F satisﬁes the Communication Welfare Theorem (CWT) if any
m e s s a g ev e r i f y i n ga na l t e r n a t i v ex ∈ X in F veriﬁes a budget equilibrium (B,x) that in
turn veriﬁes that x is in F.
CWT is illustrated in Figure 2. When applied to messages m that fully reveal a state
R (i.e., µ−1 (m)={R}, which would be represented by a single point in Figure 2), CWT
says that for any x ∈ F (R) we can construct a budget equilibrium (B,x) in state R
that veriﬁes x. Thus, CWT implies the traditional welfare theorems, and so by Theorem
1 it implies the monotonicity F. However, CWT is stronger, since it requires a budget
equilibrium verifying x to be constructed without knowing the exact state, upon observing
any communication verifying x. This strengthening indeed eliminates some monotonic
choice rules:
Example 1 Let N = 1, 1 < |X| < ∞,a n dR = P. Consider the choice rule F (R)=
{x ∈ X : L(x,R1) 6= {x}}. That is, F includes all alternatives except a single worst one
13This implies that F is realized by a budget protocol if and only if has a nonempty-valued monotonic
subcorrespondence.
13for the agent. It is easy to see that F is monotonic, hence by Theorem 1 it can be fully
realized with a budget protocol. Namely, note that budget equilibrium (B1,x) veriﬁes x if
and only if B1\{x}6 = ∅, and that any x ∈ F (R) is veriﬁed by the budget equilibrium
(L(x,R1),x).
Now ﬁxs o m ea l t e r n a t i v eˆ x ∈ X, and consider the communication protocol in which
agent 1 announces “ˆ x”i fL(ˆ x,R1) 6= {ˆ x}, and announces his preferred alternative from
X\{ˆ x} otherwise, and the announced alternative is implemented. Message “ˆ x” veriﬁes
ˆ x, but does not reveal any other alternative in L(ˆ x,R1), thus it does not verify a budget
equilibrium (B1, ˆ x) that would verify ˆ x. Therefore, F does not satisfy CWT.
T h ec h o i c er u l e st h a tdo satisfy CWT are characterized as follows:
Deﬁnition 8 Choice rule F is Intersection-Monotonic (IM) if ∀ e R = e R1 ×...× e RN ⊂ R,
∀x ∈∩ R∈ e RF (R),a n d∀R0 ∈ R such that ∩Ri∈ e RiL(x,Ri) ⊂ L(x,R0
i) ∀i ∈ N we have
x ∈ F (R0).14
To see directly that IM implies monotonicity, take e R = {R} in the deﬁnition.
Theorem 2 Choice rule F satisﬁes the Communication Welfare Theorem if and only if it
is Intersection-Monotonic.
Proof. That F satisﬁes the Communication Welfare Theorem means that ∀ e R = e R1×...×
e RN ⊂ R ∀x ∈∩ R∈ e RF (R) ∃B ∈ 2NX such that (B,x) ∈∩ R∈ e RE (R) and (B,x) veriﬁes x.
Since a larger budget equilibrium is more informative and so more likely to verify x,t h i si s
equivalent to checking that the largest budget equilibrium (B,x) supporting x in all states
from e R, which has Bi = ∩Ri∈ e RiL(x,Ri) ∀i ∈ N,v e r i ﬁes x.T h i si si nt u r ne q u i v a l e n tt o
the intersection monotonicity of F.
14A property with the same name is deﬁned by Miyagawa (2002), but he interesects lower contour sets of
diﬀerent agents, and uses the property for an apparently diﬀerent purpose. IM is also related to Sjostrom’s
(1996) Condition W, but the latter is much stronger in that it allows to construct supporting budget sets
verifying x using no information other than x itself. Therefore, Condition W allows F to be fully realized
with a “proposed action” protocol described by Ishikida and Marschak (1996), which only announces the
alternative to be implemented (formally, F itself satisﬁes Privacy Preservation).
144R e l a t i o n t o I n c e n t i v e s
The role of monotonicity in Theorem 1 is related to the literature on Nash implementation
spurred by Maskin (1999). That literature diﬀers from our setup in two ways: (a) agents
observe each other’s preferences, and (b) agents are restricted to behave in an incentive-
compatible way. Despite these crucial diﬀerences, there is a simple connection, which lies
in the fact that the Nash equilibrium correspondence in any game form can be viewed as a
budget protocol. Namely, a game form consists of a strategy space Si for each agent i and
an outcome function g : S1×...×SN → X.As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle s ∈ S1 ×...×SN is a Nash
equilibrium of the game form if and only if g (s) is each agent i’s preferred alternative in his
attainable set Bi (s)={g (s0
i,s −i):s0
i ∈ Si}. Thus, the game form is equivalent to the bud-
get protocol with the message space M = {(B1(s),...,B N (s),g(s)) : s ∈ S1 × ...× SN}.
Theorem 1 then implies the classical result of Maskin (1999) that any Nash implementable
choice rule is monotonic. The converse is not true (see, e.g., Maskin (1999, Example 2)),
because not every budget protocol can be derived from a game form.15
Can we conclude that even when agents have complete information about one another,
incentive compatibility (Nash implementation) still requires the revelation of supporting
budget sets? This conclusion is false if we allow extensive-form mechanisms. In such mech-
anisms, equilibrium play need not reveal the agents’ strategies (complete contingent plans),
and therefore need not reveal supporting budget sets. For example, consider the mechanism
constructed in Theorem 3 of Maskin (1999), which can implement any monotonic choice
rule F s a t i s f y i n ga“ n ov e t op o w e r ”c o n d i t i o nw i t hN ≥ 3 agents. This simultaneous-move
mechanism, but it can be converted into the following two-stage mechanism: In the ﬁrst
stage, agents simultaneously announce an alternative. If they agree on an alternative, it
is implemented, otherwise we move to the second stage, in which each agent announces a
state and an integer (without observing the ﬁrst-stage messages). The outcome function is
the same as described by Maskin. Applying Maskin’s arguments, it is easy to check that
15For the same reason, even when a choice rule can be Nash implemented, this may require more
communication than realizing it with a budget protocol. For example, Reiter and Reichelstein (1988)
examine the increase in communication required to Nash implement the Walrasian equilibrium choice rule.
15the two-stage mechanism still Nash implements F, yet in any equilibrium the agents agree
on an alternative in the ﬁrst stage and no other information is revealed. Thus, incentive
compatibility does not ensure the revelation of supporting budget sets when agents know
each other’s preferences.
The converse is also not true: a budget protocol does not ensure incentive compatibility.
To be sure, no agent would have an incentive to deviate by proposing another alternative
within his budget set. However, a budget protocol, being nondeterministic, does not specify
what alternative an agent could get by “rejecting” the budget equilibrium announced by the
oracle. Incentive compatibility must instead be examined in the context of deterministic
communication. When a budget equilibrium correspondence is realized with a deterministic
protocol, an agent may be able to manipulate his messages to inﬂuence his budget set to
his advantage (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Example 23.B.2)).16 Thus, in general,
the restriction to incentive-compatible protocols increases the communication burden (see,
e.g., Reichelstein 1984).
5 A Class of Intersection-Monotonic Choice Rules
This section identiﬁes a large and economically important class of intersection-monotonic
choice rules.
Deﬁnition 9 F : PN ³ X is a Coalitionally Unblocked (CU) choice rule if for some
blocking correspondence β : X × 2N ³ X,
F (R)={x ∈ X : β (x,S) ⊂∪ i∈SL(x,Ri) ∀S ⊂ N} ∀R ∈ P
N.
In words, a CU choice rule is described by specifying for any coalition S ⊂ N and any
proposed alternative x ∈ X a“ b l o c k i n gs e t ”β (x,S) ⊂ X –the set of alternatives that S
can use to block x. x is “unblocked” by coalition S if it is weakly Pareto eﬃcient for its
members within its blocking set β (x,S), i.e., if it is not possible to make all members of S
16An exception is given by “nonatomic” convex economies, in which individual agents have no inﬂuence
on the Walrasian equilibrium prices. Another exception is when an agent’s budget set depends only on
other agents’ types, as in the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism.
16strictly better oﬀ within β (x,S).17 x ∈ F (R) if it is unblocked by all coalitions.18 AC U
rule are deﬁned on the universal preference domain R = PN,b u tc a nb ec o n s i d e r e do na
restricted domain.
Lemma 1 Any CU choice rule is IM.
Proof. Suppose in negation that a CU choice rule F described by blocking correspondence
β is not IM, i.e., ∃ e R = e R1 × ...× e RN ⊂ PN ∃R0 ∈ PN ∃x ∈ X such that (a) x ∈ F (R)
∀R ∈ e R,( b )∩Ri∈ e RiL(x,Ri) ⊂ L(x,R0
i) ∀i ∈ N, but (c) x/ ∈ F (R0).(c) means that
∃S ⊂ N ∃y ∈ β (x,S) such that y/ ∈ L(x,R0
i) ∀i ∈ S. B y( b ) ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t∀i ∈ S
∃R∗
i ∈ e Ri : y/ ∈ L(x,R∗
i).C h o o s i n gs u c hR∗
i ∈ e Ri for all i ∈ S and arbitrary R∗
i ∈ e Ri for all
i ∈ N\S,w eo b t a i nR∗ ∈ e R such that β (x,S) * ∪i∈SL(x,R∗
i), and therefore x/ ∈ F (R∗),
contradicting (a).
To illustrate the proof of Lemma 1,t a k eaC Uc h o i c er u l eF, and suppose that for two
diﬀerent preferences R1,R 0
1 of agent 1 and some preference proﬁle R−1 of other agents, we
have x ∈ F (R1,R −1) and x ∈ F (R0
1,R −1). This means that in each state, x is Pareto
eﬃcient for each coalition within its blocking set. For example, the situation for coalition
{1,2} is illustrated in Figure 3, in which the box represents the coalition’s blocking set
β (x,{1,2}),a g e n t1’s preferences are increasing in the top-right direction, and agent 2’s
preferences are increasing in the bottom-down direction (as in the traditional Edgeworth
box). The Pareto eﬃciency of x for coalition {1,2} within the box in states (R1,R −1)
and (R0
1,R −1) means that the indiﬀerence curves representing R1 and R0
1 passing through
x both lie above the indiﬀerence curve representing R2 passing through x.N o w t a k e a
17We use weak Pareto eﬃciency because the strong Pareto rule is not even monotonic, let alone IM.
Note, however, that the weak and strong Pareto criteria coincide for preferences that are strictly monotonic
and nonsatiated in some divisible economic good.
18Such choice rules are also known as “respecting group rights,” with y ∈ β (x,S) interpreted as the
“one-way right” of coalition S to replace alternative x with alternative y (Hammond (1997, Section 5)).
The “rights” literature, initiated by Sen (1970), is concerned with the problem that individual and group
rights may be incompatible with each other on the universal preference domain, i.e., that “group rights-
respecting” choice rules may be empty-valued. In the applications considered in Section 8 below, the
preference domains and coalitional rights will be deﬁned in to ensure nonempty-valuedness.
17third preference R00
1 for agent 1 such that L(x,R1)∩L(x,R0
1) ⊂ L(x,R00
1).I nF i g u r e3t h i s
means that the indiﬀerence curve representing R00
1 passing through x lies above the lower
envelope of the curves representing R1 and R0
1. But this implies that the curve representing
R00
1 still lies above that representing R2, and therefore in state (R00
1,R −1), x remains Pareto
eﬃcient for coalition {1,2} within its blocking set. Since the same argument works for
all coalitions, we see that x remains unblocked in state (R00
1,R −1), hence x ∈ F (R00
1,R −1).
Iterating the argument by sequentially changing the preferences of agents 2,3, etc., we can
see that F is IM.
T h ec o n v e r s et oL e m m a1 is not true:









It is easy to verify that F is IM. On the other hand, if F w e r eaC Uc h o i c er u l ed e s c r i b e d
by blocking correspondence β, we would have y,z / ∈ β (x,S) ∀S ⊂ N (since x ∈ F (R) in
the states R in which the agents i = 1,2 share a strict preference ordering yRixRiz or
zRixRiy) ,b u tt h e nw ew o u l dh a v ex ∈ F (R) ∀R ∈ P2, which is not true.
Now we describe several important examples of CU choice rules. Note that according
to Deﬁnition 9, the empty coalition S = ∅ will block in any state, hence F can only include
alternatives in the set ¯ X = {x ∈ X : β (x,∅)=∅}, which we interpret as the set of feasible
alternatives.19 With this notation, a CU choice rule will include those feasible alternatives
that are not blocked by nonempty coalitions.
• The Pareto rule: β (x,S)= ¯ X if S = N, ∅ if S/ ∈ {N,∅}. That is, the grand coali-
tion can block any alternative with any feasible alternative, and no other nonempty
19For example, the empty coalition may be responsible for the satisfaction of resource constraints. We
permit X to be larger than ¯ X to allow budget sets that include infeasible allocations, as they may in
the Walrasian protocol. If X consisted only of feasible allocations in a convex exchange economy, the
Walrasian choice rule would not be monotonic (see Hurwicz et al. (1995)), hence it could not be fully
realized with a budget protocol.
18coalition has any blocking power.20
• The Approximate Pareto rule: β (x,S)=Xδ if S = N, ∅ if S/ ∈ {N,∅}.H e r eXδ ⊂ ¯ X
is interpreted as the set of alternatives that waste at least amount δ of resources.
In words, a feasible alternative x i sd e s i r a b l ei fi ti si m p o s s i b l et om a k ee v e r y o n e
strictly better oﬀ while wasting amount δ of resources. Thus, δ is the “compensating
variation” measure of ineﬃciency–the amount of resources that could be extracted
from the agents while compensating all of them for the change. There are many
ways to deﬁne Xδ in an economy with multiple goods. For example, if Xδ consists
of allocations that waste proportion δ of the economy’s aggregate endowment, F
chooses allocations whose “coeﬃcient of resource utilization” in the sense of Debreu
(1951)i sa tl e a s t1−δ. Alternatively, if Xδ consists of allocations that waste amount
δ of a speciﬁc good–“numeraire,” and if preferences are quasilinear in numeraire, F
chooses allocations that achieve within δ of the maximum possible surplus.
• The core: For all S 6= ∅, β (x,S)=ε(S)–the “eﬀectivity set” of coalition S.P a r e t o
eﬃciency is imposed by letting ε(N)= ¯ X. Individual rationality (i.e., voluntary
participation) is imposed by letting ε({i})={x0} for all i ∈ N,w h e r ex0 ∈ X is the
“status quo” alternative. Speciﬁcation of eﬀectivity sets for intermediate coalitions
reﬂects the coalitions’ powers. For example, the majority voting (Condorcet) choice
rule is described by ε(S)= ¯ X if |S| ≥ N/2, ∅ otherwise. In an exchange economy,
ε(S) is usually deﬁned by allowing the members of S to reallocate resources among
each other. We can also deﬁne the approximate core (quasi-core, epsilon-core) of an
exchange economy, by letting ε(S) consist of allocations that destroy at least amount
δS of resources available to the coalition.21
20If any preference Ri ∈ Ri of agent i has a maximal alternative in the feasible set ¯ X,t h eP a r e t or u l e
could be realized simply by letting the agent choose this alternative. To rule out this dictatorial solution,
the literature on the communication requirements of the Pareto rule has either considered settings in which
the feasible set is inﬁnite and noncompact, or introduced additional restrictions on the alternatives.
21In particular, Shapley and Shubik (1966) require the destruction of amount δS of numeraire, Kannai
(1970) requires the destruction of amount δS of each good, and McLean and Postlewaite (1989, Subsection
3.3) require the destruction of share δS of a given commodity bundle.
19• Stable Network: Let X =2 N×N –i.e., an alternative x ∈ X is a binary relation on
X (a list of ordered pairs of agents). (i,j) ∈ x is interpreted as the directed link from
agent i ∈ N to agent j ∈ N in network x ∈ X. The blocking sets are described by
β (x,S)={y ∈ X : y\(S × N)=x\(S × N)}.
In words, members of coalition S can change only their outgoing links. A stable
matching problem (such as that studied by Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) obtains as
particular case by deﬁning the matching relation as the symmetric part of x (i.e., a
match is a bidirectional link). The blocking sets described above allow a coalition to
break matches with outsiders but not create new matches with them.
• The No-Envy rule: Let X = X1 × ...× XN,w h e r exi ∈ Xi is interpreted as agent
i’s component of the allocation. Let
β (x,{i})={y ∈ X :( yi,y j,y −i−j)=( xj,x i,x −i−j), j ∈ N} ∀i ∈ N,
β (x,S)=∅ for |S| > 1.
In words, any individual agent can block an alternative by “trading places” with
another agent.
A Venn diagram for choice rules summarizing the above results is drawn in Figure 4.
Note that the intersection of CU rules is a CU rule, hence any combination of the above
social goals would yield a CU choice rule.
6 Minimally Informative Verifying Equilibria
We next address the question of which supporting budget equilibria must be revealed to
verify a given choice rule. We do it by characterizing the minimally informative messages
verifying a given choice rule, which, under the Communication Welfare Theorem, are all
equivalent to budget equilibrium messages. Recall that a budget equilibrium is more
informative the larger its budget sets are, thus the minimally verifying informative budget
equilibria must have large enough budget sets to verify the choice rule, but not any larger.
20First we justify the focus on minimally informative verifying messages by showing
that any message m verifying alternative x veriﬁes a minimally informative message ˜ m
verifying x. When the state space R is ﬁnite, ˜ m can be constructed by starting with m
and ﬁnding progressively strictly less informative messages verifying x while this is possible
(the procedure terminates since the number of possible non-equivalent messages is ﬁnite).
For an inﬁnite state space, we need a diﬀerent algorithm to construct ˜ m.W ep r o p o s es u c h
an algorithm and use it to characterize minimally informative messages verifying a given
choice rule.
It is notationally convenient to identify each message with its content by focusing on
direct protocols hM,µ,hi,i nw h i c hM ⊂ 2R and µ−1 (m)=m for all m ∈ M.A direct
message is a message in a direct protocol, and by Privacy Preservation it must be a product
set m1 × ...× mN ⊂ R1 × ...×R N.D i r e c t m e s s a g em is more informative than direct
message ˜ m if and only if m ⊂ ˜ m. Direct message m veriﬁes alternative x if m ⊂ F −1 (x).
Deﬁnition 10 For i ∈ N, x ∈ X, the agent i-wise x-stretch of a direct message m ⊂ R








For an illustration with N =2agents, consider Figure 5, where direct message m0 is
agent 1-wise x-stretching of direct message m.
Lemma 2 (a) Any direct message22 m ∈ 2R\{∅} verifying alternative x veriﬁes a mini-
mally informative message verifying x, which can be constructed by sequentially agent
i-wise x-stretching message m, i = 1,...,N.
(b) A direct message m ∈ 2R\{∅} is a minimally informative message verifying alternative
x if and only if it is invariant to any agent-wise x-stretching.
Proof. (a) Let m0 = m,a n df o re a c hi = 1,...,N, let message mi be the agent i-wise
x-stretching of message mi−1.N o t et h a tmi = mN
1 × ...× mN
i × mi+1 × ...× mN for all
i ∈ N.
22The most informative direct message m = ∅ is never accepted and so it is not useful for realization.
21By construction, mi ⊂ F −1 (x) for any i =0 ,...,N. This in turn implies that by
construction, mi ⊃ mi−1 for all i ∈ N, and therefore mN ⊃ m0 = m, i.e., m veriﬁes mN.
Suppose now that mN ⊂ ˆ m1 × ...× ˆ mN ⊂ F −1 (x). Then for any i ∈ N,
ˆ mi × m
i−1
−i ⊂ ˆ mi × m
N
−i ⊂ ˆ m ⊂ F
−1 (x),
and therefore by construction, mN
i = mi
i ⊃ ˆ mi.H e n c e , mN =ˆ m, and therefore mN is a
minimally informative message verifying x.
(b) “Only if” holds by the deﬁnition of a minimally informative message. “If” follows
from part (a), since sequential agent-wise x stretching of m yields m itself.
Under the Communication Welfare Theorem, any minimally informative message ver-
ifying x veriﬁes, and is thus equivalent to, a budget equilibrium message verifying x.W e
would like to characterize the verifying budget equilibria that are minimally informative.
F i r s tn o t et h a td i ﬀerent budget equilibria may generate equivalent messages. For exam-
ple, in exchange economies with monotone preferences, a Walrasian budget equilibrium, in
which the budget sets are half-spaces, is equivalent to the one in which the half-spaces are
replaced with their boundary hyperplanes (i.e., waste is not allowed). It is convenient to
focus on the largest equivalent budget equilibria:23




equivalent to a given budget equilibrium









satisﬁes the following two properties by construction:
(i) it is less informative than budget equilibrium (B,x), and (ii) it is larger than any









to (B,x). Then (ii) implies the statement of the lemma.
23One reason for this focus is that, as shown below, such an equilibrium always exists (in contrast to, say,
a smallest equivalent budget equlibrium). One might also argue on normative grounds for giving agents
as much freedom as possible while sustaining the socially desirable alternative.
22Lemma 3 allows us to focus on the largest equivalent budget equilibria, which we do
from now on. The lemma also implies some useful properties of such budget equilibria
in speciﬁc settings. In particular, when all feasible lower contour sets satisfy a property
that is invariant to set intersections, the largest equivalent budget sets must also satisfy
this property. Examples of such properties include: (i) free disposal of some good when
preferences are monotone in this good, (ii) closedness in some good when preferences
are continuous in this good, (iii) budget sets take the “private” form Bi = ˜ Bi × X−i
when the alternative space is X = X1 × ...X N and agent i’s preferences over allocations
(x1,...x N) ∈ X depend only on his own allocation xi.
For realizing an intersection-monotonic choice rule, Lemmas 2 and 3 together with the
Communication Welfare Theorem allow to restrict attention to the largest budget equilibria
that are minimally informative verifying messages. The lemmas also allow to characterize
such budget equilibria: Namely, by CWT, in agent-wise stretching we can restrict attention
to the largest equivalent budget equilibria verifying a given alternative x.T h e na g e n t - w i s e
stretching corresponds to shrinking the agent’s budget set by intersecting all of his lower
contour sets for which x is still veriﬁed given the revealed information about the other
agents’ preferences. This yields the following characterization (for convenience it assumes
t h a tt h ec h o i c er u l ei sd e ﬁned on the universal domain PN):
Theorem 3 Suppose that choice rule F is intersection-monotonic on PN.T h e n
(a) Budget equilibrium (B,x) ∈ 2NX × X is a largest minimally informative budget equi-








i) ∀i ∈ N. (1)
(b) If (1) holds for R ∈ R,t h e n(B,x) is a unique largest equivalent budget equilibrium
verifying alternative x in state R.
Proof. (a) A largest equivalent budget equilibrium (B,x) must have x ∈ Bi ∀i ∈ N,
hence we can write (B,x)=( L(x,R1),...,L(x,RN),x) for some R ∈ PN.L e m m a 3
and the intersection monotonicity of F on PN imply that any largest equivalent budget
23equilibrium of this form that veriﬁes x must have x ∈ F (R) (and by monotonicity of F,
any such budget equilibrium with x ∈ F (R) veriﬁes x. Thus, we can restrict attention to
such budget equilibrium messages. By the same token, in agent i-wise stretching of such








for ˜ Ri ∈ P




. Thus, the stretching includes all preferences R0
i ∈ Ri such









i),w h i c hb yt h e
monotonicity of F is equivalent to x ∈ F (R0
i,R −i). By Lemma 3, (B,x) is a largest
equivalent equilibrium invariant to such stretching if and only if (1)h o l d s .
(b) As noted in the proof of part (a), any largest equivalent budget equilibrium verifying
x takes the form (L(x,R0
1),...,L(x,R0
N),x) for some R0 ∈ PN such that x ∈ F (R0).I f
it is an equilibrium in state R,t h e nL(x,R0
i) ⊂ L(x,Ri) for all i. By monotonicity of F,
this implies x ∈ F (R0




In words, Theorem 3(a) establishes that the largest minimally informative budget equi-
libria are those in which each agent’s budget set is the intersection of all his feasible lower
contour sets for which x is desirable given the information about the others’ preferences.
Furthermore, Theorem 3(b) says that if the budget sets in such an equilibrium happen to
coincide with the lower contour sets in some feasible state R,t h e ni ti saunique (up to
equivalence) budget equilibrium verifying alternative x in state R.
Intuitively, intersection-monotonicity implies that alternative x is desirable when it is
high enough in the agents’ preference rankings. Then (1)m e a n st h a tx is so low in the
preference rankings that any further reduction in any agent’s preferences would render
it undesirable. In other words, (1) describes the “boundary” of the states in which x is
desirable, and this boundary describes a trade-oﬀ between the ranking of x in diﬀerent
agents’ preferences. In any state R satisfying (1), there is a unique (up to equivalence)
budget equilibrium verifying x, whose budget sets are the agents’ lower contour sets at
R. By CWT, this budget equilibrium must be a unique (up to equivalence) minimally
informative message verifying x in state R.
Finally, observe that if (1) holds in state R ∈ R, then it also holds when the domain
R is replaced with a smaller domain e R ⊂ R such that R ∈ e R.T h u s , (B,x) remains a
24unique largest equivalent budget equilibrium verifying alternative x in state R on domain
e R. This observation can be used to identify some minimally informative budget equilibria
on a reduced domain.
7 Implications for the Communication Burden
This section discusses the implications of our characterization of minimally informative
messages for the communication burden of intersection-monotonic choice rules. The (de-
terministic/nondeterministic) communication burden of a choice rule is deﬁned as the mini-
mal communication burden of a (deterministic/nondeterministic) protocol realizing it. The
communication burden of a protocol is naturally deﬁned as the length of the realized mes-
sage sequence, i.e., the number of messages sent in the course of the protocol. Since
this number may diﬀer across states, here we focus on the “worst-case” communication
burden–the maximum length of the message sequence over all states. For this measure to
be interesting, the amount of information conveyed with each message must be bounded,
so that all messages are encoded with “elementary” messages.
The computer science literature on “communication complexity” considers discrete
communication, and elementary messages that are binary, i.e., convey a bit of informa-
tion (see Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997)).24 The nondeterministic communication burden
is then the number of bits needed to encode the oracle’s message from set M,w h i c hi s
log2 |M|. In the economic literature on continuous communication, the elementary mes-
sages are real-valued. The nondeterministic communication burden is then identiﬁed with
the number of real numbers needed to encode the oracle’s message from space M, i.e.,
the dimension of M. The discrete and continuous cases have some similarities and some
diﬀerences, so we discuss them in turn.
24This is just a normalization, because an elementary message from any other ﬁnite set (alphabet) could
b er e c o d e dw i t haﬁx e dn u m b e ro fb i t s .
257.1 Discrete Communication
Starting with any protocol realizing F, we can replace any message verifying alternative x
with a less informative minimally informative message verifying x. Doing such replacement
for all messages, we obtain a new protocol realizing F using the same number of message,
but which uses only minimally informative verifying messages. Thus, in minimizing the
communication burden, we can restrict attention to protocols that use minimally informa-
tive verifying messages, which are exactly the budget equilibrium messages characterized
in Theorem 3(a).
This observation allows us to bound above the nondeterministic communication burden
of F by counting all the budget equilibria of the form (1) and taking the binary logarithm.
However, we are more interested in having a lower bound on the nondeterministic commu-
nication burden of F, which would then also serve as a lower bound on the deterministic
burden of F. Such a lower bound can be obtained using Theorem 3(b), which says that
any budget equilibrium of the form (1) for some state R ∈ R and alternative x ∈ F (R)
is indispensable for verifying alternative x in state R. However, realization (as opposed to
full realization) only requires to verify one desirable alternative in any state R.T h u s ,F
may be realized using only a subset the budget equilibria of the form (1).
Nevertheless, in applications considered below, the nondeterministic communication
burden of realization is shown to be not much smaller than that of full realization. In some
applications, a good lower bound on the nondeterministic burden of realization is obtained
by counting only the budget equilibria of the form (1) with states R ∈ R in which F (R) is
single-valued (and so by Theorem 3(b), each such budget equilibrium is indispensable for
realization). In other applications, in which single-valuedness of F (R) cannot be ensured,
the following technique proves useful: Say that Rf ⊂ R is a k-degree fooling set for choice
rule F if at most k distinct states from Rf can share a message verifying an alternative in




¯/k, and the communication burden of F is bounded below by the binary logarithm
of this number.25 This paper’s results allow to show that Rf is a k-degree fooling set by
25This is known as the “rectangle-counting” method in the computer science literature (Kushilevitz and
26showing that at most k distinct states from Rf can share a budget equilibrium of the form
(1).
7.2 Continuous Communication
The study of continuous communication requires a metric ρR on the state space R. Follow-
ing a suggestion of Debreu (1983), we use the Hausdorﬀ metric on the agents’ preference
relations derived from a given metric ρX on the underlying alternative space X.26
We would like to deﬁne the continuous communication burden as the (worst-case)
number of real-valued elementary messages sent in the course of the protocol. We also
want to allow ﬁnite-valued messages, e.g., to announce of discrete allocations, but not
counted such messages towards the communication burden. In the nondeterministic case,
we can identify the communication burden with the dimension of the oracle’s message
space M.
A well-known problem in measuring continuous communication is the possibility of
“smuggling” multidimensional information in a one-dimensional message space (e.g., using
the inverse Peano function). However, that with such smuggling, an arbitrarily small error
in the message could yield a large error in its meaning. This suggests that smuggling
is prevented when the topology on the messages space must be based on their meaning
rather than chosen ad hoc.T h u s , w e d e ﬁne the distance between two messages m and
m0 in protocol Γ = hM,µ,hi as the Hausdorﬀ distance between the events µ−1 (m) and

























0) for A,B ⊂ R.
Given this metric ρM,w eu s et h eH a u s d o r ﬀ dimension of M (see, e.g., Edgar (1990))
Nisan (1997). In the case of k =1 , Rf is simply called a “fooling set” in the computer science literature,
and “a set with the uniqueness property” in the economic literature.
26Formally, ρR (R,R0)=m a x i∈N max{dR (Ri,R 0
i),d R (R0
i,R i)},
with dR (Ri,R 0




iy0 [ρX (x,x0)+ρX (y,y0)],w h e r eρX is the given metric on X.
27as the measure of continuous communication burden.27,28 With this deﬁnition of dimM,i f
messages are coded with d real numbers with a coding whose inverse is Lipszhitz continuous
(so that small errors in the transmission of the code do not result in large distortion of the
state), then we must use d ≥ M real variables (Edgar (1990, Exercise 6.1.9(1)). Also, if M
is metrically equivalent to a set in Rd that contains an open set, we must have d =d i mM
(Edgar (1990), Exercise 6.2.6). Thus, the proposed dimensionality measure of M is the
relevant measure of communication burden if the communication must be robust to using
a channel that is subject to small errors, due either to analog noise or to discretization
(“quantization”)29
Thus deﬁned continuous communication burden can be bounded above using a fooling
set technique:
Deﬁnition 11 Rf ⊂ R is a fooling set for choice rule F if ∃C>0 such that ∀R,R0 ∈ Rf





0) ≥ CρR (R,R
0).
This deﬁnition strengthens the (1-degree) fooling set deﬁned in the previous subsection.
(The two deﬁnitions coincide when the state space R is ﬁn i t e ,s i n c ew ec a nt h e nt a k e
C =
minR,R0∈R:R06=R ρR(R,R0)
maxR,R0∈R ρR(R,R0) > 0.)
27See, e.g., Edgar (1990). Alternatively, we could use metric dimension measures of M, such as the box
dimension or the packing index. In most practical cases, the diﬀerent dimensions would coincide, provided
that M is bounded.
28This deﬁnition of the continuous communication burden stands in contrast to the existing economic
literature on message space dimension, in which the message space comes endowed with a Hausdorﬀ
topology, its dimension is deﬁned in a topological way, and a “regularity” restriction is imposed on the
communication protocol to prevent dimension smuggling. The typical regularity restriction, is that the
message correspondence µ be “locally threaded”–i.e., have a continuous selection on a neighborhood of any
p o i n t( M o u n ta n dR e i t e r1974). This restriction rules out ap r i o r isome useful communication protocols:
For example, in problems with continuous preferences and discrete (e.g., combinatorial) allocations, it
prevents the communication of discrete allocations (any selection from µ is discontinuous at a point at
which the optimal discrete allocation switches).
29A formal result about robust discretization is stated by Nisan and Segal (2003, Propositon 4).
28Lemma 4 If Rf is a fooling set for choice rule F, then the continuous communication
burden of F is at least dimRf.
Proof. Take any protocol Γ = hM,µ,hi, and any selection γ from the message correspon-
dence µ on domain Rf.W em u s th a v e





0) ≥ CρR (R,R
0),
where the ﬁrst inequality is by deﬁnition of metric ρM as the Hausdorﬀ metric, and the
second inequality is because γ (R) veriﬁes an alternative in state R and the deﬁnition
of the fooling set. Therefore, γ : Rf → M has a Lipschitz continuous inverse, hence
dimM ≥ dimRf (Edgar (1990, Exercise 6.1.9(1)).
Note that it suﬃces to checking Deﬁnition 11 only for minimally informative verifying
messages m, since for them the inequality is the least likely to hold. Thus, just as for
discrete communication, characterization (1) of minimally informative verifying messages
(budget equilibria) facilitates the calculation of the continuous communication burden for
intersection-monotonic choice rules.
8 Applications
8.1 Pareto Eﬃciency in Convex Economies
Consider smooth convex exchange economies, in which the alternatives represent the con-
sumption of L divisible goods by the N agents, hence X = RNL
+ . Each agent i’s pref-
erence domain consists of the convex preferences described by diﬀerentiable utility func-
tions of his own consumption xi ∈ RL
+ with a nonnegative nonzero gradient everywhere.
The feasible set consists of allocations of a given aggregate endowment ¯ x ∈ RL
++: ¯ X =
{x ∈ X :
P
i xi =¯ x}.Recall that the Pareto rule is described by
F (R)=
©
x ∈ ¯ X : ¯ X ⊂∪ i∈NL(x,Ri)
ª
∀R ∈ R.
29Proposition 1 A message is a minimally informative message verifying the Pareto eﬃ-
ciency of allocation x ∈ ¯ X with x À 0 in a smooth convex exchange economy30,31 if and
only it is equivalent to a Walrasian equilibrium supporting x, i.e., a budget equilibrium
(B,x) with
Bi = {y ∈ X : p · yi ≤ p · xi} ∀i ∈ N (2)
for some price vector p ∈ RL
+ such that kpk = 1. Any such equilibrium is a unique
Walrasian equilibrium supporting allocation x in any state in which it is an equilibrium.32
Proof. (B,x) veriﬁes the Pareto eﬃciency of x if and only if the normalized gradients of
all agents’ utility functions at x in all states in E−1 (B,x) equal some p ∈ RL
+.B yL e m m a s
2a n d3 ,(B,x) is a largest minimally informative budget equilibrium verifying x if and
only if for each i ∈ N, Bi is the intersection of all lower contour sets at x of agent i’s utility
functions with gradient p at x.T h i sm e a n st h a tBi is given by (2). Furthermore, in any
state in which such (B,x) an equilibrium, the normalized gradients of all agents’ utilities
at x equal p, which implies that in this state (B,x) is a unique Walrasian equilibrium
supporting x.
The proposition implies that the minimal message space required for verifying any
Pareto eﬃcient allocation in any convex economy is the space of Walrasian equilibria. Since
a feasible allocation x ∈ ¯ X is described with (N − 1)L real variables, and a normalized
price vector p is described with L − 1 real variables, the space of Walrasian equilibria has
dimension (L − 1)+( N − 1)L = NL− 1.
30We restrict attention to x À 0 to avoid the problem of non-existence of supporting Walrasian prices
(see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Figure 16.D.2)).
31If non-smooth preferences are allowed, the Walrasian equilibria remain minimally informative messages
verifying Pareto eﬃciency, but other such messages emerge. For example, let N = L =2and ¯ x =( 2 ,2),
and consider the budget equilibrium (B1,B 2,x) with x =( 1 ,1,1,1), B1 = {x ∈ X :m i n{x11,x 12} ≤ 1},
and B2 = {x ∈ X : x21,x 22 ≤ 1}. This is a budget equilibrium in state R ∈ R if and only if L(x,R1)=B1.
This is a minimally informative message verifying the eﬃciency of x, but it is not equivalent to a Walrasian
equilibrium.
32Note that the last statement is stronger than that in Theorem 3(b): In this particular setting, the
minimally informative messages verifying x partition F−1 (x).
30However, realizing Pareto eﬃciency only requires to verify one eﬃcient allocation in
each state. In fact it is possible to realize the Pareto rule without any communication, e.g.,
by giving all endowment to agent 1. To rule this out, we restrict attention to allocations
satisfying a “subsistence” requirement that kxk ≥ σ,f o rag i v e nσ < 1
N minl ¯ xl.33 Note that
the subsistence Pareto rule can be realized by ﬁxing an “endowment allocation” ω ∈ ¯ X
with ω ≥ (σ,..,σ) and announcing a Walrasian equilibrium (B,x) such that Bi 3 ω for all
i, which exist in any convex economy (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Section 17.BB). Since such




l pixil for all i,t h e yc a n
be communicated using (L − 1)+( N − 1)(L − 1)=N (L − 1) real numbers.
It is in fact impossible to realize subsistence Pareto eﬃciency using less communication.
This can be shown using the fooling set consisting of the Cobb-Douglas economies,i nw h i c h







l αil = 1. Indeed, all subsistence Pareto eﬃcient allocations in a
Cobb-Douglas economy with parameters α À 0 are interior, and the ﬁrst-order equilibrium
conditions imply that no two distinct Cobb-Douglas economies share a Walrasian equilib-
rium sustaining an interior allocation.34 Therefore, we must use a subspace of Walrasian
equilibria whose dimension is at least that of Cobb-Douglas economies, which is N (L − 1):
Corollary 1 The nondeterministic communication burden of subsistence Pareto eﬃciency
in the convex exchange economy is exactly N (L − 1) real numbers, and it is achieved by
the Walrasian equilibrium protocol with a ﬁxed endowment.
Corollary 1 was ﬁrst established by the “informational eﬃciency” literature (Hurwicz
1977; Mount and Reiter 1974). Unlike this literature, we have derived it from the purely
33The “informational eﬃciency” literature only ruled out the corners of the feasible set X, but need to
rule out neighboring allocations as well, because we do not impose any “regularity” restriction on protocols
and use a metric measure of dimensionality. Intuitively, if only the corners of X were ruled out, Pareto
eﬃciency could still be approximated arbitrarily closely without any communication, by giving nearly all
the aggregate endowment x to one agent.
34Furthermore, we can also show that Deﬁnition 11 holds: the minimal distance between a Cobb-Douglas
economy with parameters α and any economy that shares a subsistence Walrasian equilibrium with the
Cobb-Douglas economy with parameters α0 is at least C kα − α0k, provided that α,α0 ≥ (δ,..,δ) for a ﬁxed
δ > 0.
31set-theoretic Proposition 1, which does not require any topological restrictions on commu-
nication or any scalar measure of the communication burden.
8.2 Pareto Eﬃciency in Economies with Numeraire
Consider economies with numeraire, in which the set of alternatives take the form X =
K × RN,w h e r eK is a ﬁnite set of (non-monetary) allocations,a n dRN describes the
transfers of numeraire (money) to the agents. Each agent i’s preference domain Ri consists
of preferences Ri over (k,t) ∈ X that are, for all k ∈ K, (i) continuous and monotone in
his own transfer ti, (ii) do not depend on other agents’ transfers t−i, and (iii) unbounded
in numeraire, i.e., for any x ∈ X and any k ∈ K there exist t ∈ R such that (k,t)Rix.T h e
feasible set takes the form ¯ X = {(k,t) ∈ X :
P
i ti =0 }, i.e., requires a balanced budget.
Proposition 2 A message is a minimally informative message verifying the Pareto ef-
ﬁciency of allocation x =( k,t) ∈ ¯ X in an economy with numeraire if and only if it is




0) ∈ X : pi (k
0)+t
0
i ≤ pi (k)+ti} ∀i ∈ N (3)







pi (k) for all k
0 ∈ K. (4)
Any such equilibrium is a unique valuation equilibrium supporting allocation x in the states
R in which L(x,Ri)=Bi for all i.
Proof. (B,x)=( L(x,R1),...,L(x,RN),x) for some R ∈ R if and only if for each i,
Bi takes the form (3) for some pi ∈ (R∪{+∞})
K with pi(k) < +∞. Since this form is
preserved under set intersections, Lemma 3 implies that any budget equilibrium satisfying
(1) takes this form. Furthermore, x ∈ F (R) i fa n do n l yi fi ti si m p o s s i b l et oe x t r a c t







pi(k) for all k
0 ∈ K
32(note that this implies that pi (k0) < +∞ for all k0 ∈ K). (1) means that the prices pi (k0)
for all k0 ∈ K\{k} are maximized subject to the inequality, which yields condition (4).
Theorems 2 and 3 imply the proposition.
The term “valuation equilibrium” was coined by Mas-Colell (1980); such equilibria were
also studied by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002).
These papers have establishes the traditional welfare theorems for such equilibria: An
allocation is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if it is supported by a valuation equilibrium. The
contribution of proposition 2 lies is in showing that valuation equilibria constitute the
minimal information that must be revealed in order to verify the Pareto eﬃciency of an
allocation.
Proposition 2 implies that the minimal message space required for verifying any eﬃcient
allocation in any economy with numeraire is the space of valuation equilibria. Normalizing
the prices, e.g., that
P
k pi (k)=0for each agent i, we can announce a price vector
satisfying (4) using (N − 1)(K − 1) real numbers. In addition, K − 1 real numbers are
needed to announce a transfer vector t adding up to zero (a discrete allocation k is zero-
dimensional).
For realizing Pareto eﬃciency, we only need to verify one eﬃcient allocation in each
state, and so need not use all valuation equilibria. However, it turns out that all the
possible normalized valuation prices satisfying (4) still must be used. This is true even
if we restrict attention to preferences that are quasilinear in numeraire, i.e., described by
utility functions of the form ui (k,t)=vi (k)+ti. (For such preferences, Pareto eﬃciency is
equivalent to maximizing the total surplus
P
i vi (k).) Indeed, consider diagonal economies,
in which the agents’ utility functions are ui (k,t)=pi (k)+ti with p ∈ RNK satisfying (4).
In such an economy, all allocations x ∈ ¯ X are surplus-maximizing, but by the second
part of Proposition 2, the valuation equilibrium supporting any such allocation the agents’
budget sets must be described by prices p. Thus, no two distinct diagonal economies
share a valuation equilibrium, and so diagonal economies form a fooling set.35 Therefore,
realizing Pareto eﬃciency with quasilinear preferences requires the announcement of an
35Formally, to apply Lemma 4, we need diagonal economies to satisfy the stronger Deﬁnition 11 of a
fooling set, which is shown by Nisan and Segal (2003, Proposition 2).
33(N − 1)(K − 1) -dimensional price vector. This amount of communication in fact allows a
deterministic surplus-maximizing protocol, in which the ﬁrst N −1 agents announce their
normalized utilities and then the last agent chooses a surplus-maximizing allocation. Thus
we have
Corollary 2 The communication burden (both deterministic and nondeterministic) of Pareto
eﬃciency in a quasilinear economy is (N − 1)(K − 1) real numbers.
One class of quasilinear allocation problems with numeraire that has received a lot of
attention recently is the “combinatorial allocation problem,” in which there is a set L of
objects to be allocated among the agents, thus K = NL, and the preference domain includes
those quasilinear preferences in which each agent i cares only about his own consumption
bundle k−1 (i) and his preference is monotonic in this bundle (in the set inclusion order).
Consider the particular case of N =2 , and note that for any normalized price vector
p ∈ RNK satisfying (4) such that p1 (k) is nondecreasing in k−1 (1),w ea l s oh a v et h a tp2 (k)
is nondecreasing in k−1 (2). In the state in which the agents’ preferences are described by
utility functions ui (k,t)=pi (k)+ti (i = 1,2) for such prices, all allocations x ∈ ¯ X are
surplus-maximizing by (4), but the normalized price vector in any valuation equilibrium
must coincide with p by the second part of Proposition 2. Thus, any normalized monotonic
price vector for an agent must be announced by an eﬃcient protocol, which implies
Corollary 3 The continuous communication burden (both deterministic and nondetermin-
istic) of eﬃcient combinatorial allocation of L objects between two agents is 2L − 1.
To see that the deterministic communication burden coincides with the nondetermin-
istic burden, consider the communication protocol in which ﬁrm 1 announces its utility
and then ﬁrm 2 chooses an eﬃcient allocation. Corollary 3 is obtained by Nisan and Segal
(2003), who also examine the potential communication savings when agents’ combinatorial
valuations are a priori restricted to lie in certain important classes.
348.3 Approximate Pareto Eﬃciency in Economies with Numeraire
Recall that the approximate Pareto rule is deﬁned by
F (R)=
©




where Xδ ⊂ ¯ X denotes the set of alternatives in which at least amount δ > 0 of resources
is wasted. We consider the domain R with numeraire deﬁned in the previous subsection,
and let Xδ be the set of alternatives that waste at least amount δ of numeraire: Xδ =
{(k,t):
P
i ti ≤− δ}.
Proposition 3 A message is a minimally informative message verifying δ-approximate
Pareto eﬃciency of allocation x =( k,t) ∈ ¯ X in an economy with numeraire if and only if
it is equivalent to a δ-valuation equilibrium supporting x, i.e., a budget equilibrium (B,x)







pi (k)+δ for all k
0 ∈ K\{k}. (5)
Any such equilibrium is a unique δ-valuation equilibrium in the states R in which L(x,Ri)=
Bi for all i.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that (B,x)=( L(x,R1),...,L(x,RN),x) for
some R ∈ R if and only if for each i, Bi takes the form (3) for some pi ∈ (R∪{+∞})
K with
pi (k) < +∞, and that any budget equilibrium satisfying (1)t a k e st h i sf o r m .x ∈ F (R) if
and only if it is impossible to extract more than δ of the numeraire while making all agents







pi(k)+δ for all k
0 ∈ K.
(note that this implies that pi (k0) < +∞ for all k0 ∈ K). (1) means that the prices pi (k0)
for all k0 ∈ K\{k} are maximized subject to the inequality, which yields condition (5).
Theorems 2 and 3 imply the proposition.
We now focus on the domain of quasilinear preferences, for which F (R) is the set of
alternatives that approximate the maximum surplus in state R within δ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
35we restrict attention to bounded utility functions: ui(k) ∈ [0,1] for all k ∈ K, i ∈ N.
Then letting one agent choose an allocation to maximize his own utility approximates the
maximum surplus within δ = N − 1; we examine the communication burden of improving
the approximation to some δ <N− 1. Observe that any approximation δ > 0 can be
achieved with ﬁnite communication in which agents announce their utilities discretized to
multiples of a suﬃciently small ε > 0. Thus, the communication burden of approximation
should be measured with the number of bits.
We bound below the number of δ-valuation equilibria needed to ensure equilibrium
existence on the subset e R of states in which for all k ∈ K, ui (k) ∈ {0,1} for all i,a n d
P






¯ = NK,s i n c et h ev a l u e1 for any allocation k ∈ K can
be assigned to any of the N agents. Now consider how many states from e R can share
ag i v e nδ-valuation equilibrium (B,(k,t)) described by a price vector p ∈ RNK.W e c a n
assign value 1 for the proposed allocation k to one of the N agents. In all states in which
(B,(k,t)) is an equilibrium, for any allocation k0 6= k, each agent i’s utility must satisfy
ui (k
0) ≤ γi (k,k
0) ≡ ui(k)+pi (k
0) − pi (k).







ui (k)+δ = 1 + δ <N .
Therefore, for some agent i we must have γi (k,k0) < 1, and so this agent cannot have value
1 for allocation k0.T h u s ,w ea r el e f tw i t ha tm o s tN − 1 possibilities to assign value 1 for
allocation k0 among the other agents. Since this holds for any k0 6= k,ag i v e nδ-valuation
equilibrium can be an equilibrium in at most N (N − 1)
K−1 states from e R, i.e., e R is a
N (N − 1)
K−1-degree fooling set, as deﬁned in Section 7. Thus, we need to use at least
| e R|
N(N−1)K−1 =( 1 + 1/(N − 1))
K−1 such equilibria to ensure equilibrium existence on e R,a n d
the communication burden of F is bounded below by the binary logarithm of this number:
Corollary 4 When agents have quasilinear utilities in [0,1], the communication burden of
approximating the maximum surplus within δ <N−1 (i.e., achieving a better approxima-
tion than by letting one agent choose an allocation) is at least (K − 1)log 2 (1 + 1/(N − 1))
bits.
36The Corollary reproves Nisan’s (2002) Theorem 2 on the communication complexity of
the “approximate disjointness problem” using the Communication Welfare Theorem. It
can also be used to prove Nisan and Segal’s (2003) result on the communication burden of
approximately eﬃcient combinatorial auctions. Namely, they construct a “large” subset K
of allocations such that the agents can have arbitrary utilities in [0,1] for allocations from
K, and in looking for approximately eﬃcient allocations we can restrict attention to those
from K. (The allocations from K correspond to partitions of objects with the “pairwise
intersection” property.) Corollary 4 implies that achieving a better approximation than
giving all objects to one agent requires communication proportional to |K|, which proves
to be exponential in the number of objects.
8.4 Individually Rational Pareto Eﬃciency with Universal Pref-
erences and in Discrete Economies
Let us require individual rationality along with Pareto eﬃciency, with x0 ∈ X being the
status quo alternative. Formally, F is deﬁned by
F (R)=
©
x ∈ X : x
0 ∈ L(x,Ri) ∀i ∈ N, X = ∪i∈NL(x,Ri)
ª
∀R ∈ R.
Let X be a ﬁnite set, which ensures that this choice rule is nonempty-valued (e.g., it
includes agent 1’s preferred alternative from those that are individually rational for the
other agents). Consider ﬁrst the universal domain:
Proposition 4 A message is a minimally informative message verifying the Individually
Rationality and Pareto eﬃciency of alternative x ∈ X on the universal domain R = P
N
if and only if it is equivalent to a partitional equilibrium supporting x, i.e., a budget equi-
librium (B,x) in which Bi 3 x,x0 for all i ∈ N,a n d(B1,...,B N) forms a partition of
X\{x,x0}. Furthermore, any such equilibrium is a unique partitional equilibrium support-
ing alternative x in any state R ∈ PN in which L(x,Ri)=Bi for all i ∈ N.










Y ⊂X: x,x0∈Y , x0∈Bj ∀j∈N\{i}, Y ∪(∪j∈N\{i}Bj)=X
Y .






∀i ∈ N, i.e., (B,x) is a partitional equilibrium. Theorems 2 and 3 imply the proposition.
Proposition 4 implies that the minimal message space required for verifying any Pareto
eﬃcient IR alternative with universal preferences is the space of partitional equilibria.
Realization of the choice rule requires verifying only one desirable alternative in each
state, which in principle may not require all possible partitional equilibria. However, for
every partitional equilibrium (B,x) we can ﬁnd a state R ∈ PN in which L(x,Ri)=Bi
for all i and x is a unique desirable alternative. In this state, the status-quo alternative
x0 (if diﬀerent from x) is the next-best alternative to x in each agent’s preference ranking.
This ensures that the only alternatives that are individually rational for all agents in
state R are x and x0,a n dP a r e t oe ﬃciency dictates that F (R)={x}. The second part
of Proposition 4 then implies that (B,x) is a unique partitional equilibrium in state R.
Hence, all partitional equilibria must be used for realizing the choice rule.
There are NX−1 partitional equilibria with x = x0 ( e a c ho ft h ea l t e r n a t i v e si nX\{x0}
can be allocated to any of the N agents’ budget sets), and NX−2 such equilibria for any
given x 6= x0 (each of the alternatives in X\{x,x0} can be allocated to any budget set).
Adding up, we obtain NX−1 +( X − 1)NX−2 partitional budget equilibria. Taking the
binary logarithm, we obtained the number of bits that must be communicated:
Corollary 5 The nondeterministic communication burden of the individually rational Pareto
rule on the universal preference domain is exactly (X − 2)log2 N +l o g 2 (N + X − 1) bits.
When X is large, this burden is asymptotically proportional to X, which is exponen-
tially larger than that of simply naming an alternative (which takes log2 X bits). In fact,
the burden is comparable to that of full revelation of an agent’s preferences, which is
asymptotically equivalent to log2 X! ∼ X log2 X bits as X →∞ .36
One setting where the alternative space X is naturally large is the exchange economy
with L indivisible goods, in which X = NL (note that unlike in the combinatorial allocation
36Since there are X! strict preference orderings of X elements, by Stirling’s formula, it takes log2 X! ∼
X log2 X bits to communicate such an ordering as X →∞ . That allowing indiﬀerence does not raise the
asymptotic communication burden follows from the approximation of Gross (1962).
38problem described in Subsection 8.2, there is no divisible “numeraire” good). Suppose that
each agent’s preferences depend only on his own consumption of goods and are monotonic
in it. While we no longer have universal preference domain, we can focus on the case where
N =2 , and on the subset ˜ X ⊂ X of alternatives that give L/2 objects to each agent. If
the status-quo allocation x0 ∈ ˜ X, and if the agents’ preferences are restricted to be such
that they always strictly prefer to consume a larger number of objects, then all individually
rational allocations must also lie in ˜ X. Furthermore, the restriction still allows the agents
to have arbitrary preferences over ˜ X. Thus, we can restrict attention to the problem on
the set ˜ X with universal preferences, and Corollary 5 yields
Corollary 6 The communication burden of verifying an individually rational Pareto eﬃ-
cient allocation in an indivisible-good exchange economy with two agents and L objects is





Thus, the communication burden is exponential in the number of objects.37
8.5 Stable Many-to-One Matching
Let the set N of agents be partitioned into the set F of ﬁrms and the set W of workers. A
two-sided matching between ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r si sd e s c r i b e db yab i n a r yr e l a t i o nx ⊂ F×W.
With a slight abuse of notation, we also let x represent the correspondence x : N ³ N
deﬁned by:
x(i)={j ∈ N :( i,j) ∈ x or (j,i) ∈ x} for i ∈ N.
We restrict attention to many-to-one matching problems, in which a worker cannot match
with more than one ﬁrm, and so the set of alternatives is
X = {x ⊂ F × W : |x(w)| ≤ 1 ∀w ∈ W}
37The setting can also be reinterpreted as bilateral bargaining over L binary attributes, where it is
known that, other things equal, agent 1 prefers value 1 and agent 2 prefer value 0 for any attribute, but
otherwise the agents can have arbitrary preferences over attribute proﬁles. The Corollary implies that
ﬁn d i n gaP a r e t oe ﬃcient and individually rational attribute proﬁle requires exponential communication in
the number of attributes.
39We focus on matching problems without externalities, i.e., those in which each agent i’s
preferences depend only on the set x(i) of his matching partners.
The stable matching rule is a CU rule that is described with the following blocking sets
β (x,S)={y ∈ X : y\(S × S) ⊂ x\(S × S)} ∀S ⊂ N,∀x ∈ X.
In words, a coalition cannot create new matches involving outsiders, but can break any
match and can create any match between its members.38 This stable matching problem is
s t u d i e di nR o t ha n dS o t o m a y o r( 1990), henceforth RS.
Proposition 5 A message is a minimally informative message verifying the stability of a
many-to-one matching x if and only if it is equivalent to a match-partitional equilibrium
supporting x, i.e., a budget equilibrium (B,x) satisfying
Bf = {y ∈ X : y (f) ⊂ ω(f)} ∀f ∈ F,
Bw = {y ∈ X : y (w) ⊂ φ(w)} ∀w ∈ W,
for some φ,ω ⊂ F × W such that φ ∩ ω = x and φ ∪ ω = F × W. Furthermore, any such
equilibrium is a unique match-partitional equilibrium supporting matching x in any state
R ∈ R in which L(x,Ri)=Bi for all i ∈ N.
Proof. For any agent i ∈ N, Bi = L(x,Ri) for some Ri ∈ Ri if and only if
Bi = {y ∈ X : y(i) ∈ Ωi}
for some Ωi ⊂ 2W for i ∈ F or Ωi ⊂ 2F for i ∈ W. Since this form is preserved under
set intersection, any budget equilibrium (B,x) satisfying (1)m u s tt a k et h i sf o r mf o rs o m e
R ∈ R. x ∈ F (R) if and only if
(i) each worker w ∈ W prefers x to being unmatched, and
(ii) each ﬁrm f ∈ F prefers x to matching with any subset consisting of workers who
strictly prefer f to their equilibrium match and those already matched with f.
38We might also prevent a coalition from breaking matches between outsiders, but this is irrelevant when
externalities in preferences are ruled out.
40(i) means that ∅∈Ωw for each worker w ∈ W. Since the worker can match with at
most one ﬁrm, and the set of his possible matching partners in Bw is φ(w)=∪ω∈Ωwω, Bw
is not aﬀected by redeﬁning Ωw =2 φ(w). This allows to write the workers’ budget sets in
the desired form for some relation φ ⊂ F × W. Then (ii) means that for each ﬁrm f ∈ F,
2
(W\φ(f))∪x(f) ⊂ Ωf.
(1) means that each budget set Bi is the smallest possible given B−i such that the above
inclusion holds. For i ∈ F (ﬁrms), this means that Ωi =2 ω(i) for ω (i)=x(i) ∪ (W\φ(i)),
thus the ﬁrm’s budget sets take the desired form for a relation ω ⊂ F × W such that ω
and φ partition (F × W)\x. This also ensures the minimality of the budget set Bi of any
worker i ∈ W given B−i. Theorem 2 and 3 imply the proposition.
Intuitively, since a worker’s preferences depend only on his matching partner, his
(largest equivalent) budget sets can be described in terms of the available ﬁrms. On
the other hand, since a ﬁrm has preferences over groups of workers, its (largest equivalent)
budget sets can be described in terms of such available groups. A budget equilibrium with
such budget sets veriﬁes stability if and only if each ﬁrm f’s budget set includes all groups
consisting of workers who do not have f in their budget sets and those currently employed
by f. Indeed, this ensures that no deviation can make ﬁrm f and all of its new employees
strictly better oﬀ. Finally, minimally informative budget equilibria have the minimal bud-
get sets necessary for veriﬁcation; this means that each ﬁrm f’s budget set must include
exactly the groups consisting of f’s current employees and those workers who do not have
f in their budget set. Thus, in a minimally informative budget equilibrium, the ﬁrms’
budget sets are implied by the workers’ budget sets, and they can be described by listing
individual workers that are available to the ﬁrm rather than groups of workers.
The fact that combinatorial budget sets for ﬁrms need not be used brings about an
exponential reduction in the communication burden. Indeed, the workers’ budget sets are
described by a relation φ ⊂ F × W, which is communicated with at most FW bits, the
equilibrium matching x is communicated with W log2 (F + 1) bits, and the ﬁrms’ budget
sets are implied. Thus, the burden of verifying a many-to-one stable matching is O(FW) as
F,W →∞ . This is exponentially smaller than that of full revelation of a ﬁrm’s preferences




∼ W · 2W bits as W →∞
(see footnote 36 above).
For realizing the choice rule, we only need to verify one stable matching in each state,
and need not use all match-partitional equilibria. However, we can show that “almost”
all such equilibria need to be used, and so the nondeterministic communication burden
of stability is asymptotically FW bits. This is true even if the preference domain is
restricted to include only preferences that are strict and one-to-one, i.e., each ﬁrm prefers
being unmatched to matching with more than one worker. With such preferences, we can
restrict attention to one-to-one matchings x,i nw h i c h|x(i)| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N.W es h o w
that with such preferences, the uniqueness of a stable matching can be ensured by adding
one agent on each side:
Lemma 5 In the one-to-one matching problem with strict preferences, for any stable
matching x in any state R, we can add a ﬁrm f∗ a n daw o r k e rw∗ and complete the
preferences in a way consistent with R so that x∪{(f∗,w∗)} is the unique stable matching.
Proof. Let the new agents’ preferences have wRf∗w∗Rf∗ {∅} and fRw∗f∗Rw∗ {∅} for all
f ∈ F,w ∈ W, i.e., each new agent prefers all other partners to the other new agent, which
he in turn prefers to being single. For the old agents, let every ﬁrm f ∈ F rank w∗ just below
its current match x(f), and let every worker w ∈ W rank f∗ just below his current match
x(w). Such completion of preferences guarantees that matching x∗ = x ∪ {(f∗,w∗)}is
stable. We show that x∗ is a unique stable matching by contradiction: If it were not, then
by the Lattice Theorem (RS, Theorem 2.16), either the worker-pessimal stable matching xw
or the ﬁrm-pessimal stable matching xf would diﬀer from x∗.F o rd e ﬁniteness let xw 6= x∗.
By Theorem 2.22 in RS, the set of single agents is the same in xw as in x∗. Therefore,
worker w∗ must still be matched in xw, and since cannot be better oﬀ in than in x∗,w e
must have xw (w∗)=f∗. But this implies that any worker w 6= w∗ who is strictly worse oﬀ
in xw than in x∗ would have a strictly Pareto improving blocking by matching with ﬁrm
f∗. It follows that all workers must be indiﬀerent between xw and x∗, which implies that
xw = x∗, yielding a contradiction.
By the Lemma and the second part of Proposition 5, for any match-partitional budget
42equilibrium (B,x) on the ﬁrst F − 1 ﬁrms and W − 1 workers we can construct a state R
in which the unique stable matching coincides with x and the unique supporting match-
partitional budget sets coincide with B for the ﬁrst F −1 ﬁrms and W −1 workers (ﬁrm F
and worker W are matched with each other and their budget sets only include each other).
Letting for deﬁniteness F ≤ W, and considering an allocation x in which all the ﬁrms are
matched, we can let the budget set of any of the ﬁrst F − 1 ﬁrms include any of the ﬁrst
W −1 workers in addition to its current match (the workers’ match-partitional budget sets
are implied). Since any such budget equilibrium is a unique match-partitional equilibrium
in some state, we have
Corollary 7 The communication burden of stable one-to-one matching with strict prefer-
ences between W workers and F ≤ W ﬁrms is at least (F − 1)(W − 2) bits. The nondeter-
ministic communication burden of stable many-to-one matching between W workers and F
ﬁrms on any preference domain that includes strict one-to-one preferences and guarantees
the existence of a stable matching is asymptotically equivalent to FW as F,W →∞ .
Corollary 7 generalizes quadratic lower bounds obtained by Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989)
for ﬁnding a stable one-to-one matching with F = W using particular querying languages.
Speciﬁcally, they only allow queries of the form “which partner has rank r in your pref-
erence ranking” (their Theorem 1.5.1) or “what rank partner i has in your preference
ranking” (their Theorem 1.5.2 ). Allowing general communication could in general reduce
the communication burden,39 but the corollary establishes that this is not the case.
The deterministic communication burden, i.e., that of actually of ﬁnding as t a b l e
matching, can in principle be substantially higher. However, for the preference domain
on which the ﬁrms’ preferences are strict and substitutable (RS Deﬁnition 6.2), a stable
matching exists and can be found using only somewhat more communication. This can
39In fact, the proving method of Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989) cannot be extended to general communica-
tion. Their proof uses a “fooling set” in which all ﬁrms have the same and known preferences over workers.
On this fooling set, we could use a simple protocol in which workers sequentially, in the reverse order of
their desirability, chose ﬁrms from those that remain available. This protocol ﬁnds a stable matching with
W steps and communicates at most log2 F bits per step.
43be done with a Gale-Shapley “deferred acceptance algorithm” (RS Theorems 6.7, 6.8),
which takes at most 3FW steps, at each of which a match is proposed, accepted, or re-
jected. Since a match is described with at most log2 (FW) bits, we have a deterministic
protocol that communicates at most 3FWlog2 (FW) bits. This only slightly exceeds the
veriﬁcation burden, and is exponentially less than full revelation of ﬁrms’ preferences over
combinations of workers.40
9 Deterministic Communication
Of course, any practical protocol must be deterministic: it must ﬁnd a desirable allocation
without the beneﬁt of an omniscient oracle. Such a protocol in general may need to reveal
more information than needed for veriﬁcation. In fact, deterministic realization of an IM
choice rule sometimes require exponentially more communication than nondeterministic:
Example 3 Let N =2and X = {x ⊂ L : |x| =2 }, for some set L such that |L| =3 m.
We interpret the agents as managers in a ﬁrms and L as a set of workers, and allocation
x ∈ X as choosing a pair of workers for a certain task. Manager 1 receives payoﬀ 1i f
the workers in x share a language, and payoﬀ 0 otherwise. Manager 1 knows privately the
language spoken by each worker. Publicly it is only known that each worker speaks one
language, there are m languages spoken by a pair of workers, and m languages spoken by
a single worker. Manager 2 receives payoﬀ 1i fx ⊂ y and payoﬀ 0o t h e r w i s e ,w h e r ey ⊂ L
is a particular group of 2m + 1 workers known privately to manager 2. The social goal
is to give both managers a payoﬀ of 1, which describes a choice rule that is CU (letting
each manager’s blocking set be X) and thus intersection-monotonic. Note that a socially
desirable pair x always exists, and it can be veriﬁed simply by announcing it, which takes
2log 2 L bits. However, the deterministic communication complexity of ﬁnding such a pair
is asymptotically proportional to L, which follows from the problem’s equivalence to the
“Pair-Disjointness” problem analyzed by Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997, Section 5.2).
40Even if a ﬁrm’s preference relation is known to be strict and substitutable, the communication burden
of describing such a relation is still exponential in W, as shown by Echenique (2004, Corollary 5).
44However, in some well-known social choice problems the gap between deterministic
and nondeterministic communication burdens proves to be small. This is trivially true
when even nondeterministic communication proves almost as hard as full revelation (e.g.,
in the surplus-maximizating combinatorial allocation problem considered in Subsection
8.2). More interestingly, the gap is also small in some cases in which much less commu-
nication than full revelation suﬃces. For example, in a convex economy with the “gross
substitute” property, Walrasian tatonnement converges quickly to a Walrasian equilibrium,
which veriﬁes Pareto eﬃciency (Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Section 17.H)). Similarly, in the
many-to-one matching problem with strict substitutable preferences, a Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance algorithm converges quickly to a “match-partitional” equilibrium, which
veriﬁes stability (Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Section 6.1)). In both these mechanisms, at
each step, the designer oﬀers budget sets for the agents, and the agents report their optimal
choices from their respective budget sets. If the choices are inconsistent, the designer ad-
justs the budget sets to be “closer” to being an equilibrium. A “substitutability” condition
on the agents’ preferences allows to construct an adjustment process that is monotonic, and
therefore converges quickly (enormously faster than full revelation). Some of the agents in
such mechanisms even have the incentives to report truthfully (e.g., nonatomic agents in
Walrasian tatonnement, the proposing agents in a deferred acceptance algorithm).
10 Conclusion
The “market design” literature has examined the attainment of socially desirable allo-
cations using “price discovery” mechanisms, such as ascending auctions, tatonnement,
and deferred acceptance algorithms. However, this literature has not answered two fun-
damental questions: (1) Why and when is the focus on “price discovery” mechanisms
justiﬁed? and (2) How should the “necessary” price space for a given problem be con-
structed? Instead, a few papers have proposed ad hoc price spaces for speciﬁcp r o b l e m s
and established fundamental welfare theorems for them–see, e.g., Milleron (1972), Mas-
Colell (1980), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), Kelso
and Crawford (1982), Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2004).
45The present paper answers both questions by analyzing the minimal information that
must be communicated in order to solve a given social choice problem when the preference
information is distributed among the agents. The analysis answers (1) by characterizing
the social choice problems for which any minimally informative verifying message is a
price equilibrium (more generally “budget equilibrium”), and answers (2) by constructing
the minimally informative verifying price equilibria for any given social choice problem.
Thus, the paper provides a justiﬁcation for and characterizes the scope of the “market
design” approach (as opposed to more general mechanism design), and characterizes the
form of “prices” that must be discovered to solve a given social choice problem. Contrary
to widespread belief, prices are necessary not in order to incentivize the agents, but in
order to aggregate distributed information about their preferences into a socially desirable
decision.
To be sure, the paper does not fully solve the general “market design” problem of
solving a given social choice problem with a practical mechanism that is deterministic
and incentive-compatible. However, the paper has two important implications for this
problem. The ﬁrst implication is that in some social choice problems (such as the eﬃcient
combinatorial allocation problem), the space of prices that must be discovered proves to
be prohibitively large, and the communication of such prices proves to be almost as hard
as full revelation of preferences. In such cases, the designer of a practical mechanism must
either moderate her goals or restrict attention to a smaller preference domain. The second
implication is for the problems for which the required space of supporting prices proves
to be manageable, and their communication proves much simpler than full revelation. For
such problems, the characterization of the price space oﬀers some clues for the design of
practical mechanisms that must ﬁnd an equilibrium from this space. In some important
cases, mentioned in Section 9, a price (budget set) adjustment process can be constructed to
converge quickly to a verifying budget equilibrium and to provide agents with the incentives
for truthful reporting. Identifying more general approaches to constructing deterministic
and incentive-compatible mechanisms solving a given social choice problem with minimal
communication is an important question for further research.
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Figure 5: Agent 1-wise Stretching 
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